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Abstract
A collective understanding that traces a debate between ‘what is science?’ and 
‘what is a science about?’ has an extraction to the notion of scientific knowledge. 
The debate undertakes the pursuit of science that hardly extravagance the dogma 
of pseudo-science. Scientific conjectures invoke science as an intellectual activity 
poured by experiences and repetition of the objects that look independent of any 
idealist views (believes in the consensus of mind-dependence reality). The realis-
tic machinery employs in an empiricist exposition of the objective phenomenon by 
synchronizing the general method to make observational predictions that cover all 
the phenomena of the particular entity without any exception. The formation of sci-
ence encloses several epistemological purviews and a succession of conjectures cum 
refutation that a newer theorem could reinstate. My attempt is to advocate a holistic 
plea of scientific conjectures that outruns the restricted regulation of experience or 
testable hypothesis to render the validity of a chain of logical reasoning (deductive 
or inductive) of basic scientific statements. The milieu of scientific intensification 
integrates speculation that loads efficiency towards a new experimental dimension 
where the reality is not itself objective or observers relative; in fact the observed 
phenomenon divulges in the constructive progression of preferred methods of falsi-
fiability and uncertainty.
Keywords Inductive probabilities · Falsifiability · Test and refutation · Hypothetico-
deductivism · Karl Popper · Hilary Putnam
Introduction
The query that traces a debate in a parallel way between ‘what is science?’ and 
‘what is a science about?’ has a lineage to the notion of scientific knowledge. The 
creation model of the earth and the evaluation theory conjecturally seem different 
since the methodological expansion of the account does not fit with each other. A 
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scientific attitude needs to be opened for the natural laws, an explanatory module 
of experience, objectivity, and the conjecture of falsifiability, i.e. there may be an 
open account of the possibility to be flawed. This hypothesis invokes science as an 
intellectual activity poured by the experience of the world independent of human 
history and the human mind. Here the realistic explanation characterizes an account 
against some objectivity by synchronizing a fundamental principle or general for-
mulae that covers all the phenomena of that particular entity without any exception, 
like Newton’s laws of motion that gives us the general formulae regarding the theory 
of motion that describes the relation between the motion of the object and the forces 
acting on it. James B Conant wonderfully says, “Science is a dynamic undertaking 
directed to lowering the degree of the empiricism involved in solving problems; or 
if you prefer, science is a process of fabricating a web of interconnected concepts 
and conceptual schemes arising from experiments and observations and fruitful of 
further experiments and observations.” (Conant 1954: 62).
Can we claim that a good number of the scientific explanations have some enrol-
ments to the predictions that exemplify the causal efficacy between the past state of 
affairs and its future resultant? What sort of certainty is there? One more query that 
looks pertinent here is, “How could science be possible without the inductive and 
the deductive theorems?”.
Backdrop
We know that the Pythagorean orientation delimits the spooky religious analysis 
of the creation of the earth. The creationist account of world creation in a Bibli-
cal way vindicates knowledge of the mathematical harmony sited in the structural 
format of the universe. We are yet to restrain seeing the physical world through the 
spectacle of mathematics and logic. The meanings of scientific theories differ from 
the general vernacular uses of theories. Scientific theories are comprehensive, test-
able, and systematic evidential observations of the natural world, phenomena, and 
objects. Besides being compelling regularities, a comprehensive study of the science 
requires two types of constructing laws—universal law (regularities without excep-
tion) and statistical law (quantitative statement relies on proximity and probability). 
All the universal laws of science look logically simpler since the quantifier of the 
statement is nothing but the universal quantifier itself. For instance,
In physics, for everything or for all cases of x (here x  is universal or all). Now 
the point is that if any metal is heated (P stands for the heating metal in all cases of 
x), the same metal would be expanded (Q stands for an expansion of the metal in 
all cases of x). This is called the ‘thermal expansion of the non-quantitative laws’, 
whereas the statistical law articulates quantitative statistical statement based on the 
collected data sets like “India’s Covid-19 case fatality rate (CFR) slides to 1.7%”. 
The universal laws of science deal with an empirical generalization or  empirically 
known facts and it assists in envisaging facts that are yet to be known from empirical 
(x) (Px > Qx)
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and necessitation stances. Rudolph Carnap argues, “The laws of logic and pure 
mathematics, by their very nature, cannot be used as a basis for a scientific explana-
tion because they tell us nothing that distinguishes the actual world from some other 
possible world. When we ask for the explanation of a fact, a particular observation 
in the actual world, we must use of empirical laws. They do not possess the certainty 
of logical and mathematical laws, but they do tell us something about the structure 
of the world.” (Carnap 1995: 11–12) Science relies on experimental laws, but these 
laws could not be applied in every case of science like astronomy. The astronomical 
objects are out of reach, so in the laboratory, the astronomers can generate certain 
conditions like the surface of the sun and moon or the solar systems, etc., that may 
look more alike to the astronomical objects. But the laboratory experiments look as 
if more physical experiments in preference to astronomy. I wrote elsewhere, “The 
chemical analysis can make a distinction between two similar objects. It can estab-
lish one as an element and another as a compound, though both of these satisfied all 
the other ordinary criteria for being the same objects.” (Chakraborty 2020: 85) The 
experimental laws become more accurate when there is a quantitative context that 
may be measured through observation. The growth of scientific knowledge does not 
rest on the subjective temperament. It is indeed an objective-based external knowl-
edge that could know throughout the external verification and recurrence. To grow 
a scientific position one has to adjourn all the metaphysical speculations about the 
world and shrink the world into the contents of our sense experience. Our scientific 
signs of progress depend upon the following systems:
• All the experiments done basing on observation, reasoning, and evidence must 
fulfil specific facts and theories.
• The new theories are required to explain the older one adequately.
• The amendment of the old theories through the conduit of the newer one would 
be formulated with an improved explanation and adequate evidence.
A J Ayer writes, “My own view is that generalizations of law should be taken as 
equivalent in content to generalizations of fact, and it would appear to be most in 
accordance with scientific practices to allow them unrestricted scope.” (Ayer 1972: 
16).
Causal Efficacy and Scientific Ventures
In her inaugural lecture at the University of Cambridge in 1971, G. E. M. Anscombe 
explicitly relooks  the paradigmatic form of causality where necessary condition 
and exceptionless generalization do not collide. Yemima Ben-Menahem writes, 
“Anscombe’s influential Causality and Determination (1971) argues, contra the 
Humeans, that we do indeed observe and experience numerous instances of causal 
connection: pushing, breaking, burning, and so on. I agree with Anscombe. Granted, 
there are also many less evident cases, where the causal connection is not observa-
ble, but the same goes for other relations; they too are manifest in paradigmatic situ-
ations and remote from immediate experience in others.” (Yemima Ben-Menahem 
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2018: 10) However, Aristotle in Metaphysics (2018, Book IV, Chap-5) and later Spi-
noza in his succinct work Ethics (Spinoza 2006) think over causality in terms of 
necessity. Spinoza says, “Given a determinate cause, the effect follows OF NECES-
SITY, and without its cause, no effect follows” (Spinoza 2006: Book I, axiom III). 
This connection between cause–effect remains a logical connection. The conception 
of conformity in logic instigates the rationality of a speculative argumentation. So 
there may be a categorical shift from logic to the methodology where rationality 
takes a considerable role. But Hume undermines causal connections by arguing 
that no logical contradiction could have occurred if we suppose a case where the 
antecedent happened, but the consequent does not ensue. Donald Davidson asserts, 
“But in the Treatise, under ‘rules by which to judge of causes and effects’, Hume 
says that ‘where several different objects produce the same effect, it must be by 
means of some quality, which we discover to be common among them. For as like 
effects imply like causes, we must always ascribe the causation to the circumstances 
wherein we discover the resemblance.’ Here it seems to be the ‘quality’ or ‘circum-
stances’ of an event that is the cause rather than the event itself, for the event itself 
is the same as others in some respects and different in other respects. The suspicion 
that it is not events, but something more closely tied to the descriptions of events, 
that Hume holds to be caused, is fortified by Hume’s claim that causal statements 
are never necessary. For if events were causes, then a true description of some event 
would be ‘the cause of b’, and, given that such an event exists, it follows logically 
that the cause of b caused b.” (Davidson 1975: 82–83).
In science, we inculcate explaining the event and elevate logical induction based 
on the criterion of repetition, but the whole process of induction contains the par-
ticular instead of the unobservable universal. One could minimize it in explain-
ing the occurrences (effect) of the events that seem to be common sensual analy-
ses. A couple of centuries before David Hume explores that the premises about the 
observed things could not entail anything that sounds unobserved, so here the justi-
fication could not underlying on the deductive method. Hume primarily challenges 
the dubious nature of synthetic necessary connection as we can conceive its contra-
diction. Hume believes that at least the contradiction of any laws of nature could be 
conceivable since the truth of the proposition expresses only the empirical matter 
of facts that has no linkage to a priori truth (independent of experience). Humean 
causation theory shrinks causation to legitimate behaviour and consequently takes in 
causation to determinism. Needless to say, Hume’s definition of causation lays down 
three interconnected conditions: succession, contiguity in space, and the invariable 
coincidence of the same event types. Concerning the focused problem, it delimits 
the scope of growth of knowledge since an interpretation of the observed entity may 
relate to some previously unobserved inferences. For instance, when a person per-
ceives a red apple, the person never observed the taste of the apple that may deduce 
from an inference. We can shed the problem at a different level to emerge in the 
justificatory argument of ‘how could we derive an unobserved conclusion from the 
observed premises?’.
Two primary claims will inform the justification of the problem whose contours 
are to be developed. The first claim nourishes the function of inductive reasoning 
in terms of the past successes of the incidents, while the second claim justifies the 
87
1 3
Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research (2021) 38:83–101 
process of accepting uniformity premises as our experience illustrates a uniformity 
of the universe. Hume argues that here one has to use an additional premise that 
seems unobserved; otherwise, the whole argument would lead towards a fallacy. 
Ayer writes, “And in any case, Hume is right in saying that we cannot have the best 
of both worlds; if we want our generalizations to have empirical content, they cannot 
be logically secure; if we make them logically secure, we rob them of their empirical 
content. The relations which hold between things, or events, or properties, cannot be 
both factual and logical.” (Ayer 1973: 219).
More interestingly, this unobserved premise could not be a priori in the Kantian 
sense. To make it more scientific, the additional premise might be an a posteriori 
proposition that relies on experiences instead of reasoning. To be more precise, 
the principle of the uniformity of the universe hinges an unobserved conclusion 
in science by depending on the observed premises to open scopes for an inductive 
knowledge that holds a justificatory expectancy (since a uniformity premise is an 
empirical one) in our belief systems. Hume’s stance liberates the forum of empiri-
cism regarding the unobserved premises for getting its justificatory position, and the 
justification of the unobserved premises is the matter of inference from the observed 
propositions. The philosophical reasoning of disdaining the theory lies in the uni-
formity premise that manifests skepticism as to the unobservable premises, which 
could not be logically and scientifically resemblance (pretty generalization) to the 
observed premises. The principle of unwarranted assertibility emphasizes that the 
past incidents barely semblance to future incidents from the scheme of purported 
justification. However, Goodman argues, “To say that valid predictions are those 
based on past regularities, without being able to say which regularities, is thus quite 
pointless. Regularities are where you find them, and you can find them anywhere…” 
(Goodman 1972: 388).
When the laws are universal and depend on generalization issues, the elemen-
tary deductive logic plays its discretion by inferring unobservable facts. But in the 
case of statistical laws, the module of logical sequences entails probabilistic state-
ments. The trail of induction versus deduction synchronizes the sphere of science. 
Induction in a traditional way contrasts with deduction so far as deduction goes from 
the general to the particular, while induction goes conversely, from the particular to 
the general. It is nothing but a misleading oversimplification. We can detect various 
types of inferences in deduction as well as many kinds of inferences that may be set 
up in induction. The conception of “inductive inferences” is yet to delimit into the 
facts to laws, but it logically illustrates the “non-demonstrative”, where the conclu-
sion remains to barely follow the logical necessity when the truth of the premises is 
approved. We are emphasizing the concept of probability or degrees of probability 
that one may call inductive probability to an extent.
In a nutshell, it is nonetheless promising to see what sort of inductive probabili-
ties are there in the form of inductive reasoning. Two types of probability—sub-
jective and objective probability contend with the field of inductive inference. The 
‘subjective probability’ consists of the probable truth-value of the subject’s belief 
about a particular proposition like expecting rain, whereas the ‘objective probabil-
ity’ measures the probability of the occurrence of an objective incident indepen-
dently of the concerned subject’s mind like the forecast of the rain by meteorology 
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department. Bird clarifies, “However, contrasting with this is the indeterminacy 
of certain irreducibly probabilistic laws, such as the laws governing the decay of 
atomic nuclei. These are irreducible in the sense that there are no further facts or 
laws that altogether fix deterministically the decay of a particular nucleus (which 
would make nuclear decay like coin tossing). (Some physicists have believed that 
nuclear decay is coin tossing. Such a belief promoted Einstein’s famous remark that 
‘God does not play dice with the universe’. According to Einstein’s view, there are 
hidden variables that do determine decay. It is our ignorance of these that makes 
decay look probabilistic. But most physicists accept that Einstein was wrong about 
this.) If there are irreducibly probabilistic laws then the chance that a nucleus will 
decay in a certain time will be an objective property of that nucleus. Irreducibility 
probabilistic laws put the case for an objective notion of probability in its strongest 
form.” (Bird 2003: 191–192).
Besides, the key feature of the deductive argument lies in the necessary relation 
between premises and conclusion because here one’s conclusion is contained within 
the sphere of the premises. So, the truth-value of the conclusion deduces from the 
truth-value of the premises. Let us make out the issue from the sense of causality. 
What does it imply to allege that one event caused another or premises caused a 
conclusion? The concept of causality is not an entity but a process that looks static. 
When we say ‘cigarettes cause cancer’, then we mean that the habit of smoking ciga-
rettes or taking tobacco is a single cause for the event of cancer. There may be some 
other causes or conditions of having the disease cancer, but smoking cigarettes is 
the cause of the impact of cancer. Now the query is whether the causal relation is 
necessary or probable? It seems to be one of the relevant laws for the event, but it 
could not turn out as necessary laws. The causal relation in a precise sense stands for 
predictability, a type of potential predictability (not at all an actual predictability). 
Carnap suggests, “For this reason, when I use the term ‘predictability’ I mean it in a 
somewhat metaphorical sense. It does not imply the possibility of someone actually 
predicting the event, but rather a potential predictability. Given all the relevant facts 
and all the relevant laws of nature, it would have been possible to predict the event 
before it happened. This prediction is a logical consequence of the facts and laws.” 
(Carnap 1995: 192–193).
The problem is that one has to disregard the logical necessity from the entailment 
of objective necessity. An objective necessity comprises a causal empirical alliance 
between the objects and their properties connecting by the natural laws, while the 
logical necessity may secure the analytical proposition bringing the idea of a priori 
truth that tracks back to non-empirical systems. Scientific modification engrosses a 
shift in the standard beliefs of science and makes a trenchant transform of world-
view, methodology and logical reasoning.
Karl Popper in Defence of Scientific Knowledge
In his celebratory work Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy (Russell 1919, 
reprinted 1950) Bertrand Russell inquires the sense of grammar to define what 
is this thing called number. The impetus of his writing on this mathematical 
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philosophy came from the short and splendid book of Gottlob Frege tilted Grund-
lagen der Arithmetik (Frege, The Foundations of Arithmetic, 1960). The idea of 
number sounds pluralistic and there is a common criterion that may be shared in 
the same objects that numerically characterized certain collection or sets of the 
same objects. For instance, the number 12 may characterize as a dozen bananas. 
Russell (Russell 1950: 12–13) emphasizes two distinct ways to define the number 
of a set or collection.
a. The definition of the intension of a class helps us defining the common and shar-
able properties of the class that could not be theoretically reduced to the definition 
of extension one. For instance, mankind or the people of India, etc.
b. The definition of extension in actual enumerates the class or the set that could be 
reduced to an intensional one. For instance, a trio = x, y, z
These two ways lead to study the definition of number from three different 
angels:
First, since the number itself stands for an infinite collection, the process of 
enumeration (the definition of extension) could not deny it.
Secondly, in some cases where the given numbers of terms (like sets or col-
lection) outwardly consist of an infinite collection or sets. For instance, there are 
infinite numbers of a dozen in the world, or else one has to believe in the finite 
model of the objects.
Thirdly, we theoretically prefer to define a number as infinite. It helps us to 
talk about the common properties of infinite numbers in terms of the definition of 
intension.
In a nutshell, Russell claims that the number of a class semblance with the 
member of that particular class, and he says, “One class is said to be “similar” 
to another when there is a one–one relation of which the one class is the domain, 
while the other is the converse domain.” (Russell 1950, 16) Here believing in the 
method of defining a number as a successor of the previous number (like number 
2) is the successor of the number 1 etc., now the process of the successor would 
be equivalent to the finite number of the times as Russell argued. Even for Rus-
sell, a property in the natural number theory turns towards heredity, a module of 
succession, i.e. if the property belongs to the particular number P, the same prop-
erty repeatedly would be in the successor of P, for instance, P + 1. This method 
hinges on the induction method, and Russell wonderfully argues, “A property is 
said to be ‘inductive’ when it is a hereditary property which belongs to 0. Simi-
larly, a class is ‘inductive’ when it is a hereditary class of which 0 is a member” 
(Russell 1950: 21–22). Here the conception of hereditary and its successor trace 
back to the evidential support of the previous number, so the inductive logical 
anticipation seems to be more necessary and mathematically justifiable.
Let us remind a remarkable passage once said by great physicist Max Planck—
“We have no right to assume that any physical laws exist, or if they have existed 
up until now, that they will continue to exist in a similar manner in the future.” 
Karl Popper has enormously disparaged this aromatic formula in his two 
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well-known works The Logic of Scientific Discovery (Popper 1959) and Objective 
Knowledge An Evolutionary Approach (Popper 1972). According to Popper, the 
traditional philosophical problem of induction draws a streak between induction 
and the expectancy that the future would be in the vein of the past and dissemi-
nates also that the logic of scientific view would be analogous to inductive logic. 
Because the philosophers who hail the inductive method may reckon in the true 
edge of the logical analysis that is nothing but the inductive logical form where 
one could cease universal statement passing through a singular observational 
statement. In his book Objective Knowledge, Popper dubbed the commonsense 
problem of induction as the ‘bucket theory of the mind’ as the commonsense 
assists in making us believe in the regularities (repetition) of nature irrespectively 
being contrasted to the events that turn towards expectancy.
Hume nurtured two separate problems of induction regarding human knowl-
edge—logical and psychological problems of induction. The logical problem of 
induction synchronizes the reason from the observation level to the unobservable 
conclusion because of the coherence and repetition of the incidents or events over 
time, whereas the psychological problem of the induction copes with the belief sys-
tems of the agent where we have some experience, and these experiences instigate us 
to expect to believe (a custom of habit in Hume’s word) in a particular forthcoming 
unobserved conclusion that would be followed by the previously observed premises. 
Hume rebuffs these principles to secure  objective science and experience inclined 
knowledge that I discussed earlier. Popper daunts the approach of Humean logic but 
appreciated the implicit distinction between the logical and the psychological deri-
vation of inductive reasoning. Popper reinstates the psychological terms (subjective) 
into the sphere of objectivity in the amendment of logical problems. It will help us 
dispose of the subjective psychological beliefs by placing them into the objective 
explanatory statements. Popper writes, “Once the logical problem,  HL, is solved, the 
solution is transferred to the psychological problem,  HPS, on the basis of the fol-
lowing principle of transference: what is true in logic is true in psychology. (An 
analogous principle holds by and large for what is usually called ‘scientific method’ 
and also for the history of the science: what is true in logic is true in the scientific 
method and the history of science.)” (Popper 1972: 6) For Popper, this synthesis 
would be  riddance of Hume’s irrationalism regarding the method of induction. Even 
following Hume’s appreciative theory (an induction could not be replaced by repeti-
tion in logic), Popper pivots the principle of transference that outmoded any kind of 
induction by its repetition form not only in the scheme of the logical approaches but 
in conjunction with the scheme of the psychology or any other natural sciences. Pop-
per and Hume are on the same page when the problem is oriented to the justification 
of the empirical reasoning of the explanatory universal truth by segregating the non-
observed statements. They disdain this particular theory because ‘no number of true 
test statements would justify the claim that an explanatory universal theory is true.’ 
Although an inconsistency is commencing between them, but Popper restricts his 
theory and argues, “Yes, the assumption of the truth of the test statements allows 
us to justify the claim that an explanatory universal theory is false.” (Popper 1972: 
7) The problem (logical induction) became severe as the truth-value (truth or fal-
sity) of the universal law rests on the given test statements, even if the truth of test 
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statements that find justification through ‘empirical reasoning’ could turn out a false 
explanatory universal theory. A panorama that Popper anchored in his writing trusts 
for a novel conjecture of thinking about deduction in science and converses the idea 
of ‘whiff of induction’ as the pursuit for justification dealt with induction are noth-
ing but hypotheses that should be eliminated. A few of many arguments delineate a 
new light to the approach of formulating the probability hypothesis in science and 
philosophy. I appreciate the point when Popper evolutionarily argues, “The realiza-
tion that all knowledge is hypothetical leads to the rejection of the ‘principle of the 
sufficient reason’ in the form ‘that a reason can be given for every truth’ (Leibniz) or 
in the stronger form which we find in Berkley and Hume who both suggest that is a 
sufficient reason for unbelief if we ‘see no [sufficient] reason for believing.’’ (Popper 
1972: 30) The principle of sufficient reason comes together with the causal principle 
viz. sufficient cause.
In Popper’s view, the scientific conjecture does not initiate with the method of 
observation and they infer a general theory anchored in the finite number of past 
observation. Moderately, Popper believes that the scientific conjecture first sets off 
a theory that sounds an uncorroborated one, and hence they evaluate its prediction 
of being true or false with the evidential premises and a variety of testable conse-
quences. If the conclusion turns experimentally falsified, the scientists seek out a 
new alternative. Donald Gillies writes, “Science does not start with observations, as 
the inductivist claims, but with conjectures. The scientist then tries to refute these 
conjectures by criticism and testing (experiments and observations). A conjecture 
which has withstood a number of severe tests may be tentatively accepted, but only 
tentatively. We can never know a scientific theory, law, or generalization with cer-
tainty. It may break down on the very next test or observation (as in the case of the 
discovery of black swans in Australia).” (Gillies 1993: 29) The place of induction 
in science is delimited in the Popperian hypothesis, while the inferences that value 
to science are in actual refutation-oriented and upholds failed predictions in parallel 
to premises and entails a theory at the back of these premises which is falsified too. 
The whole process appreciates only deductive reasoning that collides with an induc-
tive one. Science, according to Popper, is a succession of conjectures and refutation 
that could be reinstated by a newer theorem. The concept of falsification is a defin-
ing criterion that assists science to cut off itself from the ‘pseudo-sciences’.
Why Objective Knowledge Matters?
The structural pattern of the world synchronizes having the tripartite models of con-
scious, unconscious, and Plato’s conception of sui generis (third world), a world that 
is made intelligible through Forms or Ideas. Popper develops an ontological dis-
tinction and brings back the problem of three worlds that eventually encompass the 
physical world (physical states), the mental world (mental states), and the world of 
the intelligible (the ideas in the objective sense). The second world (mental world) 
mediates the rest of the two worlds. How could we set up objectivity of the third 
world or is it a subjective element of our content of thought?
92 Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research (2021) 38:83–101
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The problem of Plato’s leniency of the third world sounds one-sided since 
he emphasizes the universal notion that never takes the mathematical proposi-
tions seriously like ‘5 times 10 equals 50′ etc. A stoic’s formulation in so far as it 
entails a linguistic (language centric) analysis of the third world. Popper claims, 
“Theories or propositions, or statements are the most important third-world 
linguistic entities…It was the Stoics who first made the important distinction 
between the (third-world) objective logical content of what we are saying and the 
objects about which we are speaking. These objects, in their turn, can belong to 
any of the three worlds: we can speak first about the physical world (either about 
physical things or physical states) or secondly about our subjective mental states 
(including our grasp of a theory) or thirdly about the contents of some theories, 
such as some arithmetical propositions, and say their truth or falsity.” (Popper 
1972: 157–158).
The realist group pioneered by Plato instigates the eternal verities of an auton-
omous third world, independent of the subject’s existence. While the empiricist 
group headed by Locke initially appreciates the non-constructiveness of eternal 
verities of Platoian Ideas but considers these as twaddle that sets aside from the 
real, man-made things for the usages of the human beings. Popper intertwines 
the two antagonist groups in his philosophical conjectualism and refutes the rigid 
sense of realist and idealist accounts. Popper says, “I suggest that it is possible 
to accept the reality or (as it may be called) the autonomy of the third world, 
and at the same time to admit that the third world originates as a product of 
human activity…According to the position which I am adopting here, the third 
world (part of which is human language) is the product of men, just as honey is 
the product of bees, or spiders’ webs of spiders. Like language (and like honey) 
human language, and thus larger parts of the third world are the unplanted prod-
uct of human actions…” (Popper 1972: 159–160). Numbers, for Popper, are an 
excellent example of the man-made products of the human language in a Lockean 
sense, although the problem of the prime number seems autonomous, so it doubt-
lessly falls under the realm of the third world in the Platonic sense.
The growth of knowledge indeed underpins the language in these three worlds. 
My understanding suggests that we may take it from the satisfactory objective 
ground to exhibit the justification of the proposition of the cognitive significance 
in terms of the scientific statements. The growth of scientific knowledge fosters 
experience or observation in two diverse directions:
a. Being allied to the objective properties that have a causal disposition.
b. The attitude of universal law that transcends experience.
To sue a distinction between the observational and theoretical terms relying on 
the scientific convention of the logical terms sounds spooky. One could abstain 
from the circularity reasoning of the jargon all universal terms stand for the uni-
versal laws by entailing observational phrases here like there might be a universal 
term that does not fit with any universal law, but it has the sophisticated propen-
sity to reduce in the observational term. Promoting the rejection of the theoretical 
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and observational terms could consequently prop up the falsifiability of both 
accounts since its counter instance may be conceivable. So the conjecture of the 
scientific knowledge would be falsifiable in accord with the falsifiability of the 
accounts of theoretical or observational terms.
In a broad sense, the growths of objective knowledge in a rudimental way 
revives the sense experience and weaken the scope of a metaphysical hoof that 
speculates a world consisting of entities independent of experience. We can-
not adopt the transcendental outlook of ontology in these scientific conjectures 
to congregate the skeptical stand against objective knowledge. Popper begs the 
question that observation can only counter the consistency theories but does not 
support these.
W. V. Quine, in his splendid work Pursuit of Truth (Quine 1992), initially 
agreed with Popper and the section entitled ‘Observation Categorical’ almost to 
the end of another section entitled ‘Test and refutation’; one could find a strong 
agreement between Quine and Popper. But in the last section of ‘Test and refuta-
tion’, Quine says something that Popper would disagree with:
It is clearly true, moreover, that one continually reasons not only in refu-
tation of hypotheses but in support of them. This, however, is a matter of 
arguing logically or probabilistically from other beliefs already held. It is 
where the technique of probability and mathematical statistics is brought to 
bear. Some of those supporting beliefs may be observational, but they con-
tribute only in company with others that are theoretical. Pure observation 
lends only negative evidence, by refuting an observation categorical that a 
proposed theory implies. (Quine 1992: 13).
As I understand this, Quine’s considerate position is that Popper looks right in 
arguing that observations by themselves cannot cling to a hypothesis. But Popper 
holds that in conjunction with theories that we accept, seems to be contrary to 
the empiricism of how we traditionally understood the theory. We are not accept-
ing just because these hypotheses are supported by observations but because we 
have, to some extent arbitrarily, decided to add them to ‘the backlog of theory’. 
As Putnam points out, “A common objection to arguments from indispensabil-
ity for physics to realism with respect to mathematics is, of course, that we do 
not yet have, and may indeed never have, the ‘true’ physical theory; my response 
is that, at least when it comes to the theories that scientists regard as most fun-
damental (today that would certainly include quantum field theories), we should 
regard all the rival theories as candidates for truth or approximate truth, and that 
any philosophy of mathematics that would be inconsistent with so regarding them 
should be rejected.” (Putnam 2012: 223) Moreover, the Quinian view insists on 
where the method of probability and mathematical statistics is brought to bear, 
hence there is such a thing as probabilistic support in retrospect of the develop-
ment of mathematical statistics. The staking principle of the satisfactory explana-
tion of science is meant to be set for a causal explanation where the explicans and 
explicandum have a causal and testable interface. The growth of scientific knowl-
edge detains not only the logical emblem but the theory of empirical method 
(experience-based).
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Spinning Out
The deductive method is the only logical technique that could be an elementary 
part of scientific conjectures. In this deductive process, according to Popper, the 
concluding proposition is entailed from the premises. Here the conclusion is sub-
merged with the other pertinent statements to resolve whether they falsify in the 
sense of corroborating the hypothesis by eliminating the errors. In his work, The 
Logic of Scientific Discovery, Karl Popper (Popper 1995: 32–33) envisages four 
synchronized steps in defending deduction.
a. The first step emphasizes a formal account where one could think about testing 
the internal constancy of the theoretical structure to justify whether it upholds 
any contradiction or not.
b. The second step comes up with a semi-formal step where we underline two 
diverse elements together – its empirical elements and its logical elements. The 
scientific conjectures have explicit form by giving prioritizing the logical element 
to equivocate asking the wrong questions. Most scientific theories restrain analytic 
(i.e. a priori) and synthetic elements, and it looks inevitable to axiomatize these 
to distinguish the empirical from the logical one.
c. The third step promotes a comparison account among the new theory with the 
accessible theories to expose a constructive advancement over these theories. It 
sounds essential since the process of adopting a new theory relies on the con-
stitute advancement of the older one; on the contrary, if the new theory fails to 
resolve the previously unsolvable problems of the existing theory, without pro-
viding enhanced empirical content and shreds of evidence, there is no question 
of the adaptability of the new theory and its successors. This is the primordial 
cum theoretical process of science that expands the progress of science. At that 
point, Popper claims that the comparison of the existing and newer theories and 
its advancement relies on the deductive testing (more significant empirical content 
plus predicative power) of both theories in preference to an inductive one like 
in Physics where Einstein’s Theory of Relativity reinstated Newton’s Theory of 
Universal Gravitation.
d. The fourth step pivots on the testing of a theory by its experiential application of 
derived conclusion. Here the showability of the truth-value of conclusion entails 
the unverified corroboration of the theory while the falsity of the conclusion 
undertakes a signal that could be logically falsified. The quest of the science 
would be to find a better theory or more precisely, the method of theory-testing 
would underscore the singular proposition deduced from the new theory, a type of 
risky prediction, but could be experimentally testable. Popper also argues that the 
corroboration of the new theories has relied on a new prediction that makes the 
older one falsified as adopting a compelling hypothesis,  on the contrary, the falsi-
fication of the theory derives from its false prediction. Popper intends to celebrate 
empiricism as the growth of the scientific method entangles in the method of 
experience, but he does not believe in that experience, which in actual determines 
95
1 3
Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research (2021) 38:83–101 
the theory rather, he appreciates the delimitation of any scientific conjectures that 
turns towards falsity.
In consequence, Popper writes, “For scientific laws, too, cannot be logically 
reduced to the elementary statements of experience. If consistently applied, Witt-
genstein’s criterion of meaningfulness rejects as meaningless those natural laws the 
search for which as Einstein says, is ‘the supreme task of the physicist’: they can 
never be accepted as genuine or legitimate statements. Wittgenstein’s attempt to 
unmask the problem of induction as an empty pseudo-problem was formulated by 
Schlick in the following words: “The problem of induction consists in asking for a 
logical justification of the universal statements about reality…We recognize, with 
Hume, that there is no such logical justification: there can be none, simply because 
they are not genuine statements.” (Popper 1995: 36–37).
At his the Herbert Spencer lecture, Oxford University in 1914 Russell hopes, 
“The failure of philosophy hitherto has been due in the main to haste and ambi-
tion: patience and modesty, here as in other sciences, will open the road to solid and 
durable progress.” (Russell 1989: 120). The question about the justification of the 
scientific theory thrusts into the experience. The issue traces on the manner where 
a slight difference between observational and theoretical sentences are jotted down. 
The scientific conjectures have two different tools—analysis and falsifiability that 
cope with observational sentences to foresee a deduction method from theories. As 
we know that the classic inductive account ramifies the confirmation of theory in 
terms of the certain auxiliary conditions like A1, B1, and C1 that turn out as true, in 
contrast the falsifiability hypothesis cherishes the deductive method where the fal-
sification of any auxiliary conduction may put together the whole theory as false. 
The refutation method of scientific conjectures involves the falsity of the sentence 
in an account of the falsity of the premises. What looks promising to Popper is the 
true refutation of the scientific theories, which manifested by the counter-evidence 
versus the confirmation of the falsification of any genuine scientific theory. Any true 
scientific theory could fall into the domain of falsifiability. An enterprise of scien-
tific theory may conduit the methods of proof and disproof of the universal generali-
zation of scientific statements. Let us take an example:
‘All planets have elliptical orbits’.
The proposition is a universal theorem of all planets that must have ellipti-
cal orbits. But the concern seems opaque as the subject term of the statement, i.e. 
‘all planets’ are yet to be proved. We do not have proper evidence or observation 
regarding the total number of planets. Here the subject term sounds disproof, while 
the predicate (elliptical orbits) hinges a certainty or proof about the figure of the 
orbits due to the number of planets we have observed to date that have their ellipti-
cal orbits. We can predict from a probabilistic sense that the next planets would have 
an elliptical orbit, and Popper has argumentatively challenged this type of inductive 
reasoning in his theory. Popper thinks that the conventional account of the inductive 
reasoning would be refuted only if there is an availability of the counter-evidence 
where we could find a planet that does not have an elliptical orbit. It’s truly hard 
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to positively prove the confirmation ground of the scientific theory as most of the 
scientific theories are well-corroborated; a theory that sounds highly testable along 
with the criterion of it survives severe testing. Let me clarify here what is called the 
testability and severe testing of a scientific theory. The testability of a scientific the-
ory can clutch a testable prediction incumbent with its degree of empirical content. 
In this account, there is a good possibility to find an exception and the potentiality 
to present the world more corroborated (highly tested and yet to be refuted) that may 
turn toward falsity. Besides, the severe testing of theory relies on the prediction that 
looks highly unfeasible in our accessible knowledge, like Einstein’s prediction about 
the bending of light. Popper believes in a degree of corroboration that is connected 
to its successors’ theories. Now a tremendous sense of entailment (covertly induc-
tive) governs the theory that assists in seeing through back-ward processing on the 
simplification of its past performances. But we know that the vital edict of Popper 
intends to refute inductivism from the sphere of science. One may ask: ‘Could there 
be inductions free of severe testing in science?’ The growth of knowledge in Pop-
per’s writings pivots a development of the falsified theory to the false theory that 
is yet to be falsified. The falsifiability hypothesis has an affable inclination to the 
future falsification of the present severe testing of a universal theory. Even Good-
man’s new riddle credence on the future unpredictability of the present regulates the 
inductive concepts. Hilary Putnam considers, “Popper does not deny that scientists 
state general laws, nor that they test these general laws against observational data. 
What he says is that when a scientist ‘corroborates’ a general law, that scientist does 
not thereby assert that law to be true or even probable. ‘I have corroborated this law 
to a high degree’ only means ‘I have subjected this law to severe tests and it has 
withstood them’. Scientific laws are falsifiable, not verifiable.” (Putnam 1984: 354).
The question of anticipating the future success is a track of accepting the induc-
tion method in science, but Popper refutes the method and strikes against inductive 
inference by bringing the idea of ‘provisional conjecture’, where the scientific laws 
are yet to be falsified. To make science free from this inductivism, we have to under-
stand the ‘corroborate’ scientific theorem. One should variance the account with the 
probabilistic way to validate the verification theory. Popper’s schemata pin down a 
sophisticated account of falsifiability, where the falsification of the prediction does 
not only falsify the whole theorem but opts for a highly corroborated theory. For 
Popper, the falsifiability hypothesis is a criterion not only for theories (logical and 
probabilistic dissent) alone, but for the methods of evaluating the conjectures. The 
concept of corroboration entails a background focused diagram, where we could 
look back at the history of the theory or its derivation, these simply present reports 
of the part effects to falsify the theory or the evidential/non-evidential (inductive) 
performances of the method. Here the prediction model could be placed as a surviv-
ing theory that structures a background condition of improbability relating to pre-
diction. Putnam worried about the puzzlement here and claims, “A theory which 
implies an improbable prediction is improbable, that is true, but it may be the most 
probable of all theories which imply that prediction. If so, and the prediction turns 
out true, then Bayes’s theorem itself explains why the theory receives a high prob-
ability. Popper says that we select the most improbable of the surviving theories—
i.e. the accepted theory is most improbable even after the prediction has turned out 
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true; but, of course, this depends on using ‘probable’ in a way no other philosopher 
of science would accept.” (Putnam 1984: 357–358) Bayesians vindicate that the sub-
jective legitimacy of degrees of beliefs as an exponent might suit the probability 
calculus’ axioms. We may have different subjective probability calculus to the same 
factor, like statistical review on a particular case (predicting the intensified Covid-19 
virus eruptions in India). An increase in the conditional probability factor and the 
revision of one’s degrees of belief depend on the evidential supports.
The general laws of science or scientific theorems could be falsified if the basic 
sentences are deduced from the theories that set out the wrong prediction. Even the 
same case may be pertinent in the case of inductive logic where the prediction of 
the theory needs to be to get a true conclusion. Let us take the paradigm case of 
the science, i.e. the Law of Universal Gravitation that is not traced in the domain 
of Popper’s falsifiable hypothesis. In the last over two hundred fifty years, scien-
tists are yet to entail prediction from the Law of Universal Gravitation to make the 
theory falsifiable. So the Popperian account cannot ramify a correct analysis either 
on this scientific methodology or its practical application. Putnam raises a severe 
objection against Popper by defending the account of primary practices in science 
as any scientific ideas conduit its practical application in science, technology, and 
human life. Even in our practice, we could find out the correctness or the failures 
of an idea to see its successful long run practice or its unsuccessful and insignifi-
cant application in our daily life. The whole process of knowing the significant or 
insignificant practices of the theories or ideas in the private life of the human could 
be understood only based on experience. Putnam argues, ‘In this sense ‘induction is 
circular’. But of course it is! Induction has no deductive justification; induction is 
not deduction. Circular justifications need not to be totally self-protecting nor need 
they be totally uninformative: the past success of ‘induction’ increases our confi-
dence in it, and its past failure tempers that confidence. The fact that a justification is 
circular only means that that justification has no power to serve as a reason, unless 
the person to whom it is given as a reason already has some propensity to accept 
the conclusion. We do have a propensity—an a priori propensity, if you like—to 
reason ‘inductively’, and the past success of ‘induction’ increases that propensity. 
The method of testing ideas in practice and relying on the ones that prove success-
ful (for that is what ‘induction’ is) is not unjustified. That is an empirical statement” 
(Putnam 1984: 375).
Logic, intuition, and experience that one would be conclave in science generate a 
great methodological concern in science. Darwin’s development in science does not 
debunk a clear-headed scientific innovation while his methodological milieu sophis-
ticates a line up where the secrets of nature reveal through observation, colligating, 
doggedness (hypothesis of the inherited diffusion of acquired characters), and notic-
ing the exceptional findings. A similar anti-inductive stance has been well-appreci-
ated by Einstein who writes, ‘There is no inductive method which could lead to the 
fundamental concepts of physics’ (Einstein 1950: 76) He never slurs over the import 
of deduction and intuition in the growth of exact science. In his path-breaking work 
Relativity Einstein argues, “Guided by empirical data, the investigator rather devel-
ops a system of thought which, in general, is built up logically from a small number 
of fundamental assumptions, the so-called axioms. We call such a system of thought 
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a theory. The theory finds the justification for its existence in the fact that it corre-
lates a large number of single observations, and it is just here that the ‘truth’ of the 
theory lies.” (Einstein 1962: 123–124).
Actually a trenchant philosophical comprehension of science outsets an epistemo-
logical pledge of empiricism, an empiricist understanding of theory that looks quite 
apposite to the reason of the Hypothetico-deductivist trend of Popper. A post-Poppe-
rian account of doing science replaces different models like Kuhn’s paradigm shift 
(Kuhn 1962) and Lakatos’s scientific research programmes (Lakatos 1970). These 
are undoubtedly the methodological apprehension of demining the theory-centric 
view of science. Popper’s account seemingly enterprises a nihilistic plea where the 
scientific researches instigate falsifiable conjectures that could not apprehend any 
positive ventures of vigorous scientific theories. Popper aims to secure this objection 
by arguing that the foundation of the logic of scientific discovery relies on falsifi-
able conjectures. The reasoning judgment could not envisage the future by the whiff 
of ungrounded concomitance. The growth of genuine scientific knowledge does not 
advocate the immune nurturing of anything in support of the theory. A reasonable 
willingness to recognize any theories that have the ‘potential to be refuted by obser-
vational evidence’ lifts for the growth of scientific knowledge. But following Kuhn 
one might claim that an objective observational decision could not be a yardstick 
of the scientific theories. It lit on the contention of incommensurable aspects that 
qualified to the presuppositions, and social settings in the stage of ‘puzzle-solving 
activity’. Kuhn writes, “normal science ultimately leads only to the recognition of 
anomalies and crises. And these are terminated, not by deliberation and interpreta-
tion but by a relatively sudden and unstructured event like the Gestalt switch” (Kuhn 
1962: 104). He considers that neither any comparisons nor empirical evidences 
could induce a paradigm as flawed. The process of paradigm relation seems a three-
laired procedure that involves a set-up of paradigm, a rivalry paradigm, and observa-
tional evidence.
The underdetermination of theory by observational data (UTD), an account that 
has long been advocated by instrumentalists and later revived by Duhem and Quine 
as ‘Duhem-Quine thesis’ exposes that the growth of scientific theory does not opt 
for the self-preserved prediction but appreciates an auxiliary hypothesis as a con-
junction that may lift a prediction in general. The striking point is that the mode of 
falsification of the prediction by observable evidence cannot disprove the scientific 
theory. The scientific theory remains retained while the conjunction of theory and 
its conjoining auxiliary may turn out as flawed. Quine envisages, “Any statement 
can be held to be true come what may, if we make drastic enough adjustments else-
where in the system. Even a statement very close to the periphery can be held true in 
the face of recalcitrant experience by pleading hallucination or by amending certain 
statements of the kind called logical laws. Conversely, by the same token, no state-
ment is immune to revision.” (Quine 1961: 43).
The growth of scientific knowledge pitfalls two diverse but entwined dimen-
sions—in the prospect of discovery scientific conjectures rely on the intuition and 
deductive method while the context of its corroboration seems to experience or test 
centric. We have to elicit the logical constriction of the world and justify science 
debunking in sense-data (actual and possible) that is autonomously testable. Putnam 
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spells out, “Deflationism about reference typically goes with deflationism about 
truth. If saying that representation is a relation between organisms (and states of 
organisms and, derivatively, bits of language) and real things, properties, and events 
is ‘representationalism,’ then representationalism is no sin!” (Putnam 2016: 40) A 
celebrated dictum (realism with a human face) casts a retrospect on Wittgenstein’s 
representationalism who once says, Even the hugest telescope has to have an eye-
piece no larger than the human eye.
Synchronizing the logical aspect in reality with a representation of reality in 
human language, hitherto I find it’s appealing to philosophize science from a struc-
tural cum methodological ends. An evasion of philosophy-free science makes the 
process of knowledge of science a stupor; to find out coherence between observation 
and reason is the true manifestation of scientific pursuit. The progression of science 
tends to highlight different schemata like logical, cognitive, and social. The cogni-
tive schemata give an account for a set of mental representation that interlinks to the 
mental procedure. Acquired beliefs in science are an adopted upshot of these mental 
representations and the mechanism of the cognitive procedures that uphold social 
interests and power connections. This integrated cognitive-socio schemata amends 
the scope of logical methods in scientific practices since the array of logical sche-
mata looks more trivial than the prospect of  psycho-social retrospect. Any plausible 
scientific evolution in experimental science tries to map the analogical thinking of 
the psycho-social account  like a pragmatic utility, human preference, requirement, 
prerequisite, and the appraisal of cognitive and social stratagems. Maxwell once 
says, ‘our task, in engaging in rational inquiry is to see, participate in, and help to 
grow what is significant and of value in existence in the cosmos.’ (Maxwell 1984: 
8) The descriptive and considerate explanatory parts of the scientific conjectures do 
not set apart the rudimentary constituent of human values in its implementation. A 
desirable scientific theory promotes its observational testing, fecundity, good track-
record, internal consistency, clarity, compatibility, novel prediction and quantitative 
predictions, etc. But some philosophers like Paul Feyerabend (Feyerabend 1993) 
rebut the method, and consider that no general method of scientific judgments to be 
exceptionless. The method looks as if correct, but the implication of the method in 
scientific knowledge turns out to be negative. One could amend the stance of upward 
scientific view cumulatively and cogently since we could not sensibly endorse any 
scientific knowledge to establish or reject a theorem. The accumulation of scientific 
knowledge could not uphold a priori method but appreciates a testable an a posteri-
ori method. The question of reliability tinges on a formation where testing, observa-
tion, and further development are effectively accessible. We have to judge each case 
separately as science does not appreciate any tied and rigid particular method or 
uniform enterprise. Jerry Fodor explores, “Every science implies a taxonomy of the 
events in its universe of discourse. In particular, every science employs a descriptive 
vocabulary of theoretical and observation predicates, such that events fall under the 
laws of the science by virtue of satisfying those predicates.” (Fodor 1999: 432).
The structure of science contains many epistemological purviews like the 
hypothesis of ‘projectibility’, a theory-laden methodological consideration that 
safeguards the background theories upon which these conjectures are relied on 
seem to be approximately true of unobservable (as well as observable) entities. A 
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similar point that I would like to advance here is, in principle, a holistic approach 
to scientific conjectures that goes beyond the restricted principle of experience 
or a testable hypothesis to find out the validity of a chain of logical reasoning 
(deductive or inductive) of scientific statements. I think the mould of scientific 
growth integrates a new dimension that loads a background enabling conditions 
(sometimes inductive and sometimes deductive reasoning), objective referents, 
causal explanatory efficacy, experimental methods as hypothetical tools, the 
loom of falsifiability, along with efficiency towards a new conjecture of progress-
ing from problem to problem. The reality is beyond the qualm of objectivity or 
conceptual schemata, actually, here, the observed things reveal in the preferred 
methods that sound indispensable for uncertainty and falsifiability.
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